





Analyzing the Integration of Effective Defenses against One-Day Exploits in Android Kernels

Lukas Maar, Florian Draschbacher, Lukas Lamster, and Stefan Mangard August 15, 2024

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
Improve system security

- Shttps://lukasmaar.github.io
- ✓ lukas.maar@iaik.tugraz.at


Defects-in-Depth
















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indicates fully automated

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One-Day Exploitation Analysis











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- Sources:















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




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
- Analyze 26 one-day exploitation flows
 - 🚔 10 exploit techniques







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C	/E-2019-2025	1		1									~
C	/E-2020-0030	1	x	1							1	(##\$)→ i	罰
C١	/E-2021-1968,-1969,-1940				1	1				x			±
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C١	/E-2016-3809,-2021-0399			1	1	1				x			
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C\	/E-2022-28350									*	×		
C\	/E-2020-29661									*	×		
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C\	/E-2023-26083,-0266				x					×			
C	/E-2020-0041	~		1									
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C\	/E-2021-38001				1	~				X			
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IG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON 🗞 DM6: CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED F DM7: CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON													
🏛 DM8: KSMA protection 🛛 💪 DM9: Samsung RKP 🛛 🏶 DM10: Huawei HKIP													



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DM1:




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	CVE-2022-22265			~								
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	CVE-2016-3809,-2021-0399			1	1	1				x		
	CVE-2022-20409			1								
	CVE-2023-21400			1						*	×	
	CVE-2022-28350									*	X	
	CVE-2020-29661									*	×	
	CVE-2021-22600			~								
	CVE-2020-0423	1							×	1	1	
	CVE-2022-22057						~		×	1	1	
	CVE-2023-26083,-0266				X					X		
	CVE-2020-0041	~		~								
	CVE-2019-2205	1		1								
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	CVE-2020-3680	1		1					×	1	1	
	CVE-2022-20421			1								
	CVE-2022-0847							1				
	CVE-2021-4154											
	CVE-2021-38001				1	1				X		
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E DM1: CONFIG_DEBU	G_LIST CONFIG_A	ARM64	1_UA	0	D	M3:	kma]	lloc	-cg-	*	۷V	M4: CONFIG_CFI_CLANG
<pre> DM5: CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON % DM6: CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED DM7: CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON</pre>												









Defense Inclusion and Effectiveness Analysis

Android Kernel Collection & Metadata Extraction



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- Goal:
 - **①** Determine actual security reached
 - 🖷 By downstreamed Android kernels

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- Android devices:
 - 10 vendors:









Defense Analysis







• Source code analysis:

- 1 Manual analysis of all kernel defenses
- Determine their effectiveness

Defense Analysis







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• Kernel binary analysis:

- I Automatic analysis of all kernel defenses
- Δ Depending whether the kernel includes crucial routines
 - E.g., check or permission setting function
- ➡ Determine their inclusion




Novel Findings






















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Advancement in two Advancement in two exploit techniquess.



Weaknesses in custom defenses.





1. Correlation between older kernels and more susceptibility

The use of older kernels





Weaknesses in


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Widespread absence of included and effective defenses

Advancement in two Advancement in two exploit techniquess.



Factors Potentially Contributing to this Situation



The use of older kernels

- 2. Well configured v3.10 provides more security than 38.1%of vendor-supplied kernels
 - Lack of importance regarding security-relevant features



Widespread absence

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Advancement in two Advancement in two exploit techniquess.




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








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- G "However, considering the fact that the majority of Android devices are low-end devices, it's generally not possible to apply all mitigations due to the performance reasons."







exploit techniquess.

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- "However, few models are still checking the feasibility of applying RKP due to chipset's limited performances".
- ** "As you mentioned, consider the significant performance cost, currently HKIP does not protect page tables for user address translation."
- Le Evaluation: Difference between low and high-end devices
- 3. 23.8 % susceptibility gap between high and low-end devices
 - Ferformance cost, especially for less powerful low-end devices



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Weaknesses in custom defenses.



Conclusion



- Analyzed 26 one-days targeting the Android kernel
- Identified defenses mitigating most of these one-days
- Performed a defense inclusion and effectiveness analysis
- Presented novel findings:
 - 1. Absence of effective defenses in vendor-provided kernels
 - 2. Advancement in two exploitation techniques
 - 3. Weaknesses in defenses
 - 4. Potential factors that contribute to this situation

References

- [Aza20] B. Azad. A survey of recent iOS kernel exploits. 2020. URL: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/06/a-survey-of-recentios-kernel-exploits.html.
- [Sto23] M. Stone. The Ups and Downs of O-days: A Year in Review of O-days Exploited In-the-Wild in 2022. 2023. URL: https://security.googleblog.com/2023/07/the-ups-and-downs-of-Odays-year-in.html.